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Abstract
The relationship between parties and their supporters is central to democracy
and ideological representation is among the most important of these linkages. We
conduct an investigation of party-supporter congruence in Europe with emphasis on
the measurement of ideology and focusing on the role of party system polarization,
both as a direct factor in explaining congruence and in modifying the eﬀects of
voter sophistication. Understanding this relationship depends in part on how the
ideology of parties and supporters is measured. We use Poole's Blackbox scaling
to derive a measure of latent ideology from voter and expert responses to issue
scale questions and compare this to a measure based on left-right perceptions. We
then examine how variation in the proximity between party ideological positions
and those of their supporters is aﬀected by the polarization of the party system
and how this relationship interacts with political sophistication. With the latent
ideology measure, we ﬁnd that polarization decreases party-supporter congruence
but increases the eﬀects of respondent education level on congruence. However, we
do not ﬁnd these relationships using the left-right perceptual measure. Our ﬁndings
underscore important diﬀerences between perceptions of left-right labels and the
ideological constraint underlying issue positions.
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1 Introduction
Political parties are the primary vehicles for aggregating voters' interests in elections.
Hence, the ideological linkage between parties and voters is central to the nature of polit-
ical representation (Powell, 2000; Huber and Powell, 1994; Dalton and Anderson, 2011).
A core question within this topic is how ideologically close politicians are to their vot-
ers. This line of inquiry dates back at least to Miller and Stokes (1963) and produced a
long tradition of linking politicians and voters in the US (e.g. Gerber and Lewis 2004;
Lewis and Tausanovitch 2015; Clinton 2006), in Europe (e.g. Klingemann et al. 2017)
and beyond (e.g. Saiegh 2015).
This voter-elite congruence may be distorted by a variety of factors at the individ-
ual, party and system levels. This can include voters lacking the knowledge to align
with like-minded politicians (Jessee, 2010; Lachat, 2008; Kroh, 2009) or politicians failing
to represent those voters (Klingemann et al., 2017; Canes-Wrone et al., 2002; Rogers,
2017). Both these factors being party-supporter incongruence can be aﬀected by party
polarizationthe ideological dispersion of parties within the party system (McCarty et al.,
2006; Lachat, 2008). On the one hand, polarization may directly result in parties being
dealigned from their supporters (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015; Fiorina and Levendusky,
2006). On the other hand, party polarization provides clarity to party representation by
establishing clearer, more distinct reputations to which voters may respond (Levendusky,
2010; Hetherington, 2001).
How can we determine the degree of alignment between parties and voters? A key
methodological concern in assessing ideological congruence is what constitutes ideology.
As Poole (2005) notes, individuals' views on various policies tend to be related to an un-
derlying tendency, or constraint (Converse, 1964). These relationships need not be based
on substantive relationships among issues but rather may reﬂect a packaging of policies
by elites. This underlying ideology can be seen as a psychological space that predicts
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the response to stimuli, such as roll-call votes or survey questions. These preferences are
therefore spatial and, at least for elites, can be relatively low-dimensional (Poole, 2005).
Because of this, scholars studying mass-elite linkages often assume that ideological
positions can be captured by the symbolic concepts of left and right. That is, if
individuals are aware of a main underlying dimension of political positions, they can
perceive their location and that of political parties on a single conceptual scale. While left-
right labels are a spatial analogy, these placements rely on the assumption that individuals
compress the relevant policy space into these concepts. Moreover, these labels depend
both on voters' capacity to make use of this information (Palfrey and Poole, 1987) and
on their subjective notion of how these labels correspond to the ideological information
they have about themselves and parties (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Brady, 1985). In
short, voters diﬀer in their use, understanding and deﬁnition of these labels.
The distinction between the notion of ideology as a constraint that binds together
disparate policy choices versus a scale based on symbolic labels is an important one. The
process that maps issues into latent preference space is likely to diﬀer from that which
produces self and party perceptions on a symbolic left-right scale (Ansolabehere et al.,
2008). The idea of policy or ideological distance as a latent quality of attitudes or as a
symbolic label is therefore important to the concepts of party and voter policy locations.
In turn, this distinction is pertinent to the mechanism behind how party polarization
could increase or decrease the distance between parties and voters. Further, it aﬀects how
party polarization would inﬂuence the relationship between political sophistication and
the assessment of ideological distances.
Here, we examine this measurement distinction in the context of parties' congruence
with their voters, how it is aﬀected by party polarization, and how polarization inﬂuences
the eﬀect of political sophistication on party-supporter alignment. To place parties and
voters on a common scale, we take advantage of the features of the 2014 European Election
Study (EES), which includes a set of issue questions corresponding to an expert survey of
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party positions as well as left-right self and party placements. We apply these measures
to the question of whether party polarizationthe overall dispersion of party positions
mitigates or exacerbates the ideological gap between parties and their supporters. We use
a latent measure based on several issue scales in the EES and Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015) to examine how party polarization aﬀects the ideological gap
between party supporters and their preferred parties. We examine ﬁrst the direct impact
of polarization on the distance between voters and parties in a system and, second, how
polarization modiﬁes the eﬀect of individual sophistication on party-supporter congruence.
We then compare each of these ﬁndings to a measure based on left-right party and self-
perceptions, which also aims to place parties and supporters on a comparable scale.
In the process, this study contributes to our understanding of the importance of mea-
surement when using survey data for research questions on ideology. First, we exploit
Keith Poole's Blackbox scaling method (Poole, 1998; Poole et al., 2016) to integrate voter
self-placements with expert party placements on common issues and derive jointly-scaled
latent positions. We compare this to an alternative approach based on left-right percep-
tion. For this, we make use of Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977),
following Palfrey and Poole (1987), to put self- and party- left-right placements on a
common scale that adjusts for certain forms of perceptual bias.
We argue that the distinction between a latent policy space and a left-right perceptual
notion of representation is conceptually important for the study of both ideological con-
gruence and polarization. Moreover, these measures result in diﬀerent observed empirical
patterns with regard to the role that polarization plays in distorting such party-supporter
alignments and in mediating the eﬀect of political sophistication. In particular, we ﬁnd
that polarization diminishes congruence while enhancing the importance of sophistication
when positions are based on the latent ideology measure. Meanwhile, we observe diﬀerent
or even opposite patterns when measuring ideology via the left-right measure. The diﬀer-
ences between the two measures are highly consequential for the meaning of polarization
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and congruence, and thus for the relationship between these quantities and with political
sophistication.
2 Congruence between Politicians and Citizens and Party
Polarization: Literature and Expectations
Since the classic work of Miller and Stokes (1963) on constituency-legislator represen-
tation, many studies have empirically examined how parties and politicians represent
voters' preferences focusing on the context of congruence between politicians and voters.
In European democracies, a large literature deals with individual party-voter linkages
and directly assesses congruence between parties and their voters on a left-right spec-
trum (Boonen et al., 2017; Klingemann et al., 2017; Thomassen, 2005; Klingemann, 2009;
Dalton et al., 2011; Carlin et al., 2015). Understanding congruence between parties and
their supporters is important not only because it is related to whether parties serve as
vehicles for policy representation, but also because it is closely linked to the question of
whether voting behavior is based on ideological proximity (Merrill and Grofman, 1999;
Adams et al., 2005). Naturally, an important theme in much of this literature is obtain-
ing comparable estimates of voters' and elites' policy positions (Lewis and Tausanovitch,
2015; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013; Lo et al., 2014).
The literature on both US and European party representation varies with regard to
how polarization inﬂuences representation, suggesting that party polarization can con-
ceivably both distort and enhance party-voter congruence. Several works on the topic of
party congruence have emphasized the important role polarization plays in representa-
tion. An extensive US literature examines elite polarization in the US Congress (Poole
and Rosenthal, 2011; McCarty et al., 2006) and much has argued there are likely to be
a series of distorting eﬀects for representation in general (Lee, 2015; Ansolabehere et al.,
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2006; Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Mann and Ornstein, 2013) and for voter-elite congruence
in particular (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006). Comparative
literature also envisions that party polarization could reduce the broader proximity be-
tween voters and politicians. Often this is implicit in studies of the origins of polarization
(Ezrow, 2008; Dow, 2011; Curini and Hino, 2012) but is also suggested in the related
contexts of overall government congruence (Powell, 2011) or proximity voting (Pardos-
Prado and Dinas, 2010). Following this line of reasoning, we would expect that political
polarization will widen the gap between party ideological positions and party supporters'
positions.
However, other work on elite-voter alignment in the US, notably Levendusky (2010)
and Ensley (2007), suggests that party polarization can enable voters to better use ide-
ological cues by clarifying party positions. Similarly, in comparative contexts, a number
of works suggest that polarization can enhance the ideological nature of voting decisions
(Alvarez and Nagler, 2004; Dalton, 2008; Lupu, 2014) and speciﬁcally that polarization
could enhance the clarity of information available to voters (Knutsen and Kumlin, 2005;
Carroll and Kubo, 2018). Along these lines, Lachat (2008) has shown that party polar-
ization tends to increase the degree of ideological voting. If party polarization results in
voters with information to vote in a more ideologically consistent way (Levendusky, 2010),
this eﬀect would imply a stronger congruence between parties and supporters. By this
reasoning, we would expect that political polarization will reduce the gap between party
ideological positions and party supporters' positions.
In any context where voters make choices, behavior is likely to be conditioned on indi-
vidual characteristics inﬂuencing variation in their ability to obtain and use information.
Chief among these factors in literature on voting and mass opinion is political sophistica-
tion, often associated with educational attainment (Luskin, 1987, 1990; Delli Carpini and
Keeter, 1996; Goren, 2004; Gordon and Segura, 1997). More sophisticated voters may, for
example, be better able to identify diﬀerences between parties. A higher level of political
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sophistication, often measured empirically as education level, should enable voters to bet-
ter identify the ideological location of party positions when aiming to support proximate
parties (Boonen et al., 2017). In line with this traditional view, we therefore would expect
that low levels of education will widen the gap between party ideological positions and party
supporters' positions.
The informational eﬀects of polarization depend in part on how party ideological
positions serve as shortcuts (Popkin, 1994; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Lupia and
McCubbins, 1998). If polarization serves the purpose of clarifying party positions, making
it easier for less sophisticated voters to identify party locations, we would expect that
party polarization will reduce the importance of political sophistication on party-supporter
congruence.
Alternatively, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) indicate that partisanship and ideological
labels depend on political sophistication to function as heuristics that enhance voters'
decision-making process. If greater separation improves the heuristic functions of party
labels, more sophisticated voters may be better able to use them and therefore may exhibit
stronger ideological voting (Lachat, 2008), contributing to greater congruence. Therefore,
by this reasoning, we would expect that party polarization will increase the eﬀects of
political sophistication on party-supporter congruence.
3 Research Design
3.1 Measuring Ideological Linkages between Parties and Voters
To study party-supporter ideological linkages, we must obtain measures allowing us to
compare the ideology of parties and their supporters. Many variations exist in how to
calculate both polarization and congruence from a given ideology measure (Maoz and
Somer-Topcu, 2010; Golder and Ferland, 2017; Andeweg, 2011). Our concern here is
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primarily with the measurement of ideology itself, particularly the empirical task of re-
covering an ideological measure to compare parties and voters.
For our emphasis, we focus on two measures that can capture both voter and party
ideology within a party system, and thus can be applied to measure both polarization and
congruence.1 The ﬁrst measure attempts to capture the latent ideology derived from issue
scales and compare jointly-scaled respondent and party locations. We contrast this with
the very diﬀerent notion of ideological location using respondent left-right placements
of parties and voters. For left-right placements, we attempt to address the problem of
diﬀerences between voters in the perception of these labels.
These two concepts correspond roughly to substantive and symbolic notions of ideol-
ogy, respectively (Ellis and Stimson, 2009, 2012). The latent ideology measure is deﬁned
as the ideology in terms of the aggregate meaning of attitudes on narrower policy ques-
tions, in which voters place themselves and experts place parties on issue scales. This
approach has the most in common with measures using elite voting behavior to derive
latent ideology (Poole, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). By contrast, the left-right per-
ceptions measure is deﬁned as how voters perceive party positions and their own locations
in an abstract left-right spectrum. We next elaborate on this distinction.
3.1.1 Perceptual Left-Right versus Latent Ideological Positions
The meaning of ideology is ambiguous (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Feldman, 1988),
with many possible conceptualizations and deﬁnitions. We focus on two concepts of ide-
ology. First, we consider a symbolic notion of ideology as the perception of the concepts
of left and right by voters. Although the meaning of left-right varies across countries,
1Note that the scope of this paper is limited to measures developed in the work of Keith Poole, and is
not therefore intended to addresses the wide array of possible measures for these purposes. This includes
those with similar aims based on MP representation (Belchior et al., 2016; Belchior, 2013), as well as a
vast array of other measures that focus on some aspect of either polarization or congruence (e.g. Clark
and Leiter 2014; Dalton 2006; Maoz and Somer-Topcu 2010; Rehm and Reilly 2010; Pardos-Prado and
Dinas 2010; Ferland 2018; Klingemann et al. 2017)
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voters generally use ideological labels as heuristics to simplify complex political informa-
tion into a single left-right axis. These types of labels exist across most party systems
because they are a useful way to comprehend and organize relationships among parties
and the movements of policy (Knutsen, 1998, 1995). Left-right language in political sys-
tems reduces the practical complexity of political choices and political communications
(Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989) and provides a link between parties and voters. While the
content will vary widely across political systems (Huber and Inglehart, 1995), these terms
often can absorb a range of substantive conﬂicts as issue cleavages emerge. In surveys,
respondents are often asked to locate themselves and parties on the left-right spectrum.
While these perceptions are subjective judgments, a bias-adjusted version of such mea-
sures provides an informative basis for a symbolic form of party-supporter linkage (Aldrich
and McKelvey, 1977)
However, the symbols associated with left and right do not necessarily account for
the substantive distinctions revealed by policy issues. Concrete policy concepts may give
voters a clearer idea of where they stand in operational terms on matters of basic economic
and social policies. Political systems tend to aggregate information about party policy
positions into a basic underlying policy space. In this way, we can also deﬁne ideology as
the latent aggregated information seen across diﬀerences on policy issuesthe constraint
that bundles together issues (Poole, 2005). We can measure overall policy positions by
using a scaling approach to identify the latent tendencies exhibited by the issues positions.
In what follows, we describe how measures of the party policy positions and partisans'
ideology can be obtained following these left-right perceptual and latent ideology con-
cepts of policy positions.
3.1.2 Measuring Latent Ideology
To capture latent ideology, we take a joint scaling approach to link measures of party
locations on issue scales (here, placed by experts) and voter responses on equivalent issues.
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Related approaches have been fruitful in numerous settings (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015;
Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014; Lewis and Tausanovitch, 2015). Here we analyze mass
survey data from EES and an expert survey data from CHES to recover a common policy
space between voters and parties. There are unique advantages of EES 2014 and CHES
2014 for this purpose. Both of these questionnaires are organized to be consistent across
nations and, most importantly for current purposes, there are questions included in each
that are designed to be comparable between EES voters' responses and CHES experts'
judgements. The approach we take here uncovers the basic space underlying this set of
policy issues.
We unite the expert and voter responses on seven EES questions: economic inter-
vention, redistribution, government spending, civil liberties, immigration, EU integration
and environment issues to recover a common policy space.2
We use Poole's Blackbox scaling technique to uncover the basic policy space contained
within the issue scales of elite survey data (Poole, 1998; Poole et al., 2013; Armstrong
et al., 2014; Poole et al., 2016). Poole (1998) developed the Blackbox scaling procedure
speciﬁcally to directly estimate ideal points on the main latent dimensions of variance
present in a series of issues scale questions. Furthermore, by applying this method to the
policy issues that are shared across the two surveys, we can recover a common ideological
space among the respondentsin this case, the parties and voters within the survey.
We recover all of the individual voters' and parties' (the expert judgments) ideal points
by reducing survey data matrix to its basic dimensions. We decompose the original survey
2See the Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix for details. Although eight issues are recorded in each survey,
a general question on lifestyle issues in the CHES lacks a suﬃciently similar corresponding question
within the EES, which refers to the speciﬁc matter of same-sex marriage. We otherwise erred on the
side of including the remaining 11-point scale issue questions, but due to a relatively weak comparability
between the EES EU control and CHES Nationalism questions, we instead use a rescaled version of the
CHES 7-point EU Position variable because of its greater similarity to the EES question. However, we
found similar results to those presented here when using the CHES Nationalism question. More generally,
we note that choosing among various subsets of questions would certainly produce a variety of diﬀerent
results and these sensitivities are an area for future research. See the Appendix for a discussion of the
face validity of the estimates.
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data matrix on the seven issues to derive the ideal points. As described by Poole (1998),
Blackbox begins with a survey data matrix X, containing the ith individual respondent's
(i = 1, ..., n) reported policy position on the jth issue. Blackbox decomposes the matrix
to individual respondents' true coordinates (Ψ) multiplied by a matrix of weights (W ),
an intercept term (c) and an error term (E) as follows: X = [ΨW + Jnc] + E. The
coordinates of individual respondents are obtained by solving this equation, where Ψik
is the ith individual's position on the kth dimension. Below, we use the ﬁrst dimension
of this scaling output and refer to this measure below as latent ideology. The party
locations are the means of the scaled expert placement locations for each party.
3.1.3 Measuring Perceptual Left-Right Positions
To capture perceptual left-right ideology, we analyze the voters' self-reported ideology
and party placement as measured in the EES survey.3 Left-right self and party place-
ments contain information about how voters perceive themselves and party positions in a
symbolic left-right spectrum. Though this is often used in raw form, we do not use these
data directly. An important methodological issue in interpreting left-right placements is
the problem of diﬀerential item functioning (DIF) errorsthe biases in perception held
by each respondent concerning the left-right concept (Brady, 1985, 1989). For example,
extreme voters may place themselves closer to the center, while placing most parties to
one side. We follow Palfrey and Poole (1987) and use Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling (Aldrich
and McKelvey, 1977), which is designed to recover a common scale of voters and parties
within given survey that accounts to some extent for the DIF bias in left-right place-
ment of party positions and produces a set of adjusted ideal points for survey respondents
3We analyze the following questions in EES 2014. QPP13: In political matters people talk of the
left and the right. What is your position? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where `0' means left and
`10' means right. Which number best describes your position? QPP14: And about where would you
place the following political parties on this scale? How about the...? Which number from 0 to 10, where
'0' means "left" and '10' means "right" best describes this party?
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(Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Armstrong et al., 2014; Poole et al., 2016).4
Using voter data on left-right placement, this approach decomposes observed survey
data into party stimuli and voters' distortion parameters. We analyze a survey data matrix
of voters' left-right placement of party positions from the EES data which enables us to
obtain true positions for party stimuli as well as individual perceptual bias parameters.
Aldrich-McKelvey scaling uses the relationship between individual self-placements on a
left-right scale and common stimuli (parties, politicians) on the same scale to adjust
for the perceptual bias that occurs due to one's own positional perspective. This involves
estimating positions for common stimuli, calculating individual perceptual distortion, and
adjusting individual left-right self-placements. As described by Poole et al. (2016), this
approach treats voters' reported left-right positions zij as a linear function of these true
stimuli positions (ζj) and error term (µij), as follows: zij = αi + βiζj + µij. The intercept
term (αi) indicates the extent to which respondents tend to bias their party positions
rightward or leftward. The weight term (βi) captures voters' capacity to recognize party
positions overall.
Correcting for bias using these parameters results in estimates for both stimuli loca-
tions (parties) and respondents (voters) that can be compared within each survey.
4Note that below we use the MLE implementation of Aldrich-McKelvey scaling described by Poole
et al. (2016). While this results in losing observations from respondents with some missing stimuli
responses, it has an advantage for current purposes in that it requires no assumptions about the location
of the estimated stimuli locations (cf. Hare et al. 2015), which we rely on for both the congruence
and polarization measures. Although we retain these observations in the sample presented below using
the latent ideology measure, we ﬁnd similar results on key variables for that analysis when the sample
is restricted to those without missing values on the left-right perceptual measure. Note that we also
remove 14 additional observations that produce extreme values outside of the proper range of the Aldrich-
McKelvey estimates.
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3.2 Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is the distance between parties and supporters 5 on each of the
measures described above. To view this distance more closely between the two measures,
we isolate the speciﬁc example of the Netherlands. Figure 1 displays a box plot of the
distribution of the supporters of each party in the system, with points indicating the
locations of their parties. Each measure reproduces a roughly similar ordering of the
parties and their supporters, albeit with some disagreements. Yet, each provides quite
diﬀerent locations for parties and voters in relative terms, with the appearance of greater
congruence overall in the left-right measure. This baseline distinction is not surprising
given that the left-right measure is derived from voter's own perceptions, rather than
expert placements.6
Since our concern in this study is the relationship between parties and voters, we
calculate the absolute value of the ideological diﬀerence between the above-estimated
party positions and the median ideology of party supportersdeﬁned as the party for
which the respondent reports being closest to. We consider this value as the ideological
representation gap between parties, where smaller values represent a closer alignment
between parties and supporters. Thus, higher values in the analysis below imply less
party-supporter congruence. We calculate the value of the ideological gap between parties
and supporters for parties in the 28 countries in EES 2014.7 Since the results of this
absolute value calculation are highly skewed, we transform this quantity by taking the
square root and use a linear model below on the resulting variable.
We standardize the range of the left-right perceptual measure by subtracting the coun-
5The the parties associated with supporters are based on EES question pp21, which readsDo you
consider yourself to be close to any particular political party?
6Indeed many of the diﬀerences in the ﬁndings presented here are also likely to be directly related to
the use of perceived versus expert positions for party locations between the measures.
7The total number of respondents with information on party support is 15,341, 1,771 of which are
unable to produce measures on either dependent variable due to missing data on issue or party placements.
We also remove parties that have less than 5 usable supporter observations in the survey.
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Figure 1: Example Party Locations and Voter Distributions in The Netherlands
Notes: VVD: People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, PVV: Party for Freedom, PvdA: Labour Party,
GL: GreenLeft, D-66: Democrats 66, CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal. Boxes represent distributions
of supporters' positions. Points indicate party positions.
try mean and dividing it by the standard deviation of the individual ideal point scores
within the survey. This ensures that the variation in party-supporter congruence is not
determined by the scale diﬀerences across countries in this measure.8
3.3 Independent Variables
Our concern here is how polarization and individual sophistication aﬀect party-supporter
ideological alignment. For a measurement of political sophistication, we use the education
level of the respondent indicated in the EES. The notion of political sophistication is often
treated as correlated with, and therefore proxied by, measures of educational attainment
8While the latent ideology measure establishes a comparable scale across countries via joint-scaling of
all countries, the scores from the left-right perceptual measure are generated country-by-country. These
data lack common stimuli across countries necessary to directly establish a cross-country common scale
via Aldrich-McKelvey scaling. Without standardizing the range of the ideal points in the system in the
left-right perceptual measure, surveys producing a wider absolute range of ideal points would appear to
have both larger party polarization and larger voter-party gaps, resulting in correlations as an artifact of
the scale diﬀerences.
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(Neuman, 1986; Luskin, 1987, 1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Mondak, 1999; Goren,
2004; Highton, 2009). We make a binary variable for education level, which is designed
to standardize and simplify the education measure across cases. This binary variable
represents `high' and `low' education within each country-year, with those who are equal
or greater than the country median education level coded as 1, and others coded 0.
We also control for the party location on the measure in question due to the possibility
that party-supporter linkages may diﬀer systematically between parties with left and right
positions. Similarly, we include the location of the respondent on the same measure to
control for any diﬀerences between voters on the left and right. Finally, we control for
the vote share of the respondent's supported party, as reported in the CHES data.
4 Results
We use a multi-level linear model with country-level and party-level random eﬀects. Table
1 shows the results of multi-level regression analysis for the latent variable measure. The
results of the analysis using the left-right perceptual measure are shown in Table 2. In
each table, we examine the individual-level education level variable, Education, as well as
the individual-, party- and country-level control variables described above. In the second
model for each dependent variable, we include the interaction between country-level party
polarization and the respondent's education level.
With regard to the latent ideology measure, party polarization increases the distance
between voters and parties. Predicted values from the ﬁrst model in Table 1 are shown
in the left side of Figure 2. Our political sophistication measure, Education Level, also
correlates with larger party-supporter distances, as expected. Less educated voters have
larger ideological distances with the parties they support. This tendency, however, is
exacerbated by polarized environments, as shown in Model 2. In fact, in the least polarized
environments, there is no eﬀect for education in improving party-supporter alignment.
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This is illustrated in the plot on the left side of Figure 3, which shows that the reductive
eﬀect of education is present only at higher levels of polarization. In sum, the results from
the latent ideology measure indicate that when parties are more dispersed on the main
latent dimension of ideology, this comes at the expense of congruence and increases the
disparities between less and more sophisticated voters. These results are consistent with
arguments suggesting that more sophisticated voters are advantaged in more polarized
environments.
With the left-right perceptual measure, shown in Table 2, we again ﬁnd that education
level reduces party-supporter distances as we would expect. However, we ﬁnd a very
diﬀerent pattern with regard to other variables. When the left-right perceptual measure
is used, party polarization appears to be related to stronger party-supporter congruence.
The predicted values of this eﬀect are as shown in the plot on the right side of Figure
2. The left-right perceptual measure produces results consistent with the arguments
about party polarization facilitating voters ability to identify and support ideologically
proximate parties. Furthermore, the conditional eﬀects for education just shown for the
latent measure are not observed using the left-right ideology measure. As in the results
using the latent ideological measure, education does decrease party-supporter distances in
general. However, as shown in the right side of Figure 3, a weak conditional eﬀect exists
in the opposite direction. With regard to left-right polarization, the eﬀect of education
reducing party-supporter incongruence is present only under conditions of low left-right
party polarization.
This ﬁnding is more consistent with suggestions that sophistication is more impor-
tant when parties are less clearly diﬀerentiated and provide less clear information. Taken
together, the results from the left-right perceptual measure indicate that party diﬀerenti-
ation in perceived left-right labels both improves congruence and reduces the disparities
between less and more sophisticated voters.
Also noteworthy are the diﬀerent eﬀects of two of the control variables. Party posi-
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tion has an opposite eﬀect with each measure, with the right-wing parties having higher
congruence when the latent ideology measure is used and left-wing parties having higher
congruence when using the left-right perceptual measure. The respondent's own esti-
mated position also correlates with gaps with their parties diﬀerently for each measure.
Respondents with positions further to the right have larger distances from the parties
they support on the latent ideology measure, but have smaller distances in the left-right
perceptual measure.
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Table 1: Regression results for Latent Ideology Measure
DV=Party-Supporter Distance
(1) (2)
Party Polarization .3505∗∗ .4035∗∗∗
(.1107) (.1121)
Education -.0101∗∗∗ .0112
(.0026) (.0088)
Education × Party Polarization -.1358∗
(.0535)
Party Position -.1515∗∗∗ -.1521∗∗∗
(.0304) (.0304)
Voter Position .2455∗∗∗ .2447∗∗∗
(.0091) (.0091)
Party Vote Share -.0011∗ -.0011∗
(.0005) (.0005)
Constant .3181∗∗∗ .3097∗∗∗
(.0200) (.0202)
No. Individuals 12294 12294
No. Parties 187 187
No. Countries 28 28
log(likelihood) 7383.52 7386.74
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2: Regression results for Left-Right Perception Measure
DV=Party-Supporter Distance
(1) (2)
Party Polarization -.1694∗∗ -.2135∗∗
(.0625) (.0659)
Education -.0186∗∗ -.1128∗
(.0068) (.0473)
Education × Party Polarization .1126∗
(.0560)
Party Position .0408∗∗∗ .0409∗∗∗
(.0084) (.0084)
Voter Position -.0501∗∗∗ -.0502∗∗∗
(.0047) (.0047)
Party Vote Share .0002 .0002
(.0005) (.0005)
Constant .8139∗∗∗ .8515∗∗∗
(.0529) (.0558)
No. Individuals 8331 8331
No. Parties 168 168
No. Countries 28 28
log(likelihood) -1448.13 -1446.11
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
20
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
.4
5
P
ar
ty
-V
ot
er
 G
ap
 (L
at
en
t I
de
ol
og
y)
.03 .08 .13 .18 .23 .28
Party Polarization (Latent Ideology)
.6
.6
5
.7
.7
5
P
ar
ty
-V
ot
er
 G
ap
 (L
ef
t-R
ig
ht
 Id
eo
lo
gy
)
.65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1 1.05 1.1
Party Polarization (Left-Right Perceptions)
Figure 2: Predicted Party-Supporter gap, by Party Polarization
5 Discussion
Here, we have investigated the inﬂuence of ideology measures on uncovering the relation-
ship between party polarization and party-supporter ideological congruence. As Poole
(2005) notes, issue positions are bound by a constraint that can be uncovered as a latent
property across choices. The nature of this constraint is often thought to be captured
by direct measures of left-right perceptions. That is, such data is typically interpreted
as capturing the most important diﬀerences in spatial locations. In this study, we re-
cover a latent common ideological space for European voters and parties from voter and
expert issue responses using Poole's Blackbox scaling (Poole, 1998; Poole et al., 2016).
This latent ideology measure enables us to examine correlates of distances between voters
and parties. We contrast this with a measure derived from respondents' left-right self
and party placements. For the left-right perceptual measure, we use Aldrich-McKelvey
scaling (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Palfrey and Poole, 1987) to adjust for bias in these
placement data.
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Figure 3: Marginal eﬀects of Education Level on Party-Supporter gap, by Party Polar-
ization
The choice between measures has signiﬁcant implications for the interpretation of the
relationship between party system polarization and voter-party linkages. Each measure of
ideological location we employ here is intuitive, grounded in existing work, and appears
to be face-valid. Yet, our results suggest that understanding the ideological proximity
between voters and parties depends on, among other things, how we deﬁne and measure
ideology.
While this study conducts only a limited analysis of possible variants in measurement,9
our results indicate that the relationship between party polarization and party-supporter
congruence is sensitive to the measurement of ideology, as is how polarization interacts
with political sophistication. The direct eﬀects of polarization and interactive eﬀects we
ﬁnd for education when using our latent ideology measure are not present when using
the perceptual left-right measure. Such disparate ﬁndings suggest that these seemingly
similar but fundamentally diﬀerent notions of ideology have a substantial impact on the
conclusions we can draw regarding concepts of party polarization and party-supporter
9A variety of further combinations we do not explore here would certainly yield even more variation
in results such as this. We also avoid important and widely-discussed questions of how congruence and
polarization should be calculated when using any underlying measure of ideological positions.
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distances.
In particular, we note that the latent ideology approach based on issue scales provides
a useful measure for understanding representation that has much in common conceptually
with the measures of elite locations used in other elite studies that reﬂect the ideological
constraint revealed across multiple stimuli responses (Poole, 2005; Carroll and Poole,
2014). Our ﬁndings also have a bearing more generally on how we should interpret
measures based on left-right placements.
Our results are limited only to a single survey and a comparison of just two measures.
However, they suggest the need for more research into the importance of measurement in
studies of ideological positions in party politics. To the extent latent policy space is of
interest to future work on this topic, it will be important to establish more common issue
questions between surveys of mass and elite preferences.
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A Appendix
A.1 Issue Questions from EES and CHES
Table 3: Survey Items about Policy Questions in EES 2014
Question
QPP17.1 State regulation and control of the market
0 = You are fully in favour of state intervention in the economy
10 = You are fully opposed to state intervention in the economy
QPP17.2 Redistribution of wealth
0 = You are fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth
from the rich to the poor in the COUNTRY
10 = You are fully opposed to the redistribution of wealth
from the rich to the poor in the COUNTRY
QPP17.3 Spending
0 = You are fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services
10 = You are fully in favour of cutting public services to cut taxes
QPP17.5 Civil liberties
0 = You fully support privacy rights even if they hinder eﬀorts to combat crime
10 = You are fully in favour of restricting privacy rights in order to combat
QPP17.6 Immigration
0 = You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration
10 = You are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration
QPP17.7 EU integration
0 = The EU should have more authority over the EU Member States' economic
and budgetary policies
10 = The COUNTRY should retain full control over its economic
and budgetary policies
QPP17.8 Environment
0 = Environmental protection should always take priority
even at the cost of economic growth
10 = Economic growth should always take priority
even at the cost of environmental protection
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Table 4: Survey Items about Policy Dimensions in CHES 2014
Question
ECON_INTERVEN = position on state intervention in the economy.
0 = Fully in favor of state intervention :
10 = Fully opposed to state intervention
REDISTRIBUTION = position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.
0 = Fully in favor of redistribution :
10 = Fully opposed to redistribution
SPENDVTAX = position on improving public services vs. reducing taxes.
0 = Fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services :
10 = Fully in favour of cutting public services to cut taxes.
CIVLIB_LAWORDER = position on civil liberties vs. law and order.
0 = Strongly promotes civil liberties :
10 = Strongly supports tough measures to ﬁght crime
IMMIGRATE_POLICY = position on immigration policy.
0 = Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration :
10 = Fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration
EU_POSITION = overall orientation of the party leadership towards
European integration (recoded from 7-point and reversed).
1 = Strongly favors :
10 = Strongly opposes
ENVIRONMENT = position towards the environment.
0 = Strongly supports environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth :
10 = Strongly supports economic growth even at the cost of environmental protection
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A.2 Validity of Ideology Measures
We examine the face validity of both forms of voter ideal points by comparing them with
CHES expert survey left-right locations for the parties they support. To do so, we
regress each measure on the CHES expert placement locations for left-right (LRGEN),
which were grouped into ten categorical values by rounding to integers. We simply use
a linear regression of these separate categorical values on each measure, pooling across
countries. This approach allows us to see the non-linearities that exist in the relationship.
We then generate the predicted values from this regression, as well as 95 percent conﬁdence
intervals for these values, and plot them below. The results for the latent ideology measure
are shown on the left side of Figure 4. Note that there is a rough correspondence between
voters' averages and the the party expert scores on the left-right scale, although the rank is
not strictly maintained. For comparison, we examine the face validity of the bias-corrected
left-right perceptions by the same approach, shown on the right side of Figure 4. Again,
the average voters within each ideological category show a general correspondence with
the rank order of those parties.
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Figure 4: The Relationship Between CHES Expert Left-Right and the Voters Ideal
Points using Latent Ideological measure (left side) and Perceptual Left-Right Measure
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